By creating fully qualified authorization contexts from minimal requests, a policy information point reduces the burden on developers building or integrating policy enforcement points, allows for more flexible and reusable policies, and enriches authorization contexts to allow more precise access decisions.
In access control, one system, generically known as the policy enforcement point (PEP), makes a request to anothera service, generically known as a policy decision point (PDP), for an authorization decision. The PDP uses a policy store and an authorization context to determine whether access should be granted or not. How much of the authorization context does the PEP have to provide to the PDP?
Consider the following policy1:
Managers in marketing can approve transactions if they are not the owner and if the amount is less than their approval limit.
A PDP might make the following fully qualified request to get an authorization decision:
Can user username = Alice with jobtitle = manager and department = marketing do action = approve on resource of type = financial transaction with transaction id = 123 belonging to department = finance and with amount = 3452?
This request contains all of the authorization context needed for the policy to run. A fully qualified request requires that the PEP gather all of the information about the request from various attribute sources.
Alternatively, consider this minimal request:
Can user username = Alice do action = approve on resource with transaction id = 123?
The minimal request reduces the work that the PEP must do, placing the burden on the PDP to build an authorization context with sufficient information to make a decision. We can separate this work out into a separate service called a policy information point (PIP). To build an authorization context for this request, the PIP must retrieve the following information:
- The user’s job title, department, and approval limit.
- The transaction’s owner and amount.
Building this context requires that the PIP have access to several attribute sources including the HR system (where information about Alice is stored) and the finance system (where information about transactions is stored).
Attribute Value Providers
PIPs are not usually the source of attributes, but rather a place where attributes are brought together to create the authorization context. As you saw, the PIP might query the HR and Finance systems, using attributes in the request to create fully qualified authorization context. Other examples of attribute value providers (AVP) include databases, LDAP directories, Restful APIs, geolocation services, and any other data source that can be correlated with the attributes in the minimal request.
What’s needed depends on the policies you’re evaluating. The fully qualified context should only include needed attributes, not every piece of information the PIP can gather about the request. To that end, the PIP must be configurable to create the context needed without wasteful queries to unneeded AVPs.
There is context that the PEP has that the PDP might need. For example, consider this request:
Can user username = Alice do action = view on resource with transaction id = 123 from IP = 192.168.1.23 and browser = firefox?
The PIP typically would not have access to the IP address or browser type. The PEP must pass that information along for use in evaluating the policy.
The PIP can enhance information that the PDP passes in to derive new attributes. For example, consider a policy that requires the request come from specific ranges of IP addresses. The first instinct a developer might have is to embed the IP range directly in the policy. However, this is a nightmare to maintain if multiple policies have the same range check—especially when the range changes. The solution is to use derived attributes, where you can define a new attribute,
is_ip_address_in_range, and have the PIP calculate it instead.
This might be generalized with a Session Attribute component in the PIP that can enhance or transform session attributes into others that are better for policies. This is just one example of how raw attributes might be transformed to provide richer, derived attributes. Other examples include deriving an age from a birthday, an overall total for several transactions, or a unique key from other attributes.
Benefits of a PIP
While the work to gather the attributes to build the authorization context may seem like it’s the same whether the PEP or PIP does it, there are several benefits to using a PIP:
- Simplified attribute administration—A PIP provides a place to manage integration with attribute stores that ensures the integration and interpretation are done consistently across multiple systems.
- Reduced Complexity—PIPs can reduce the complexity of the access control system by removing the need for individual access control components to have their own policy information. PEPs are typically designed to be lightweight so they can be used close to the point where the access is enforced. For example, you might have PEPs in multiple API gateways co-located with the services they intermediate or in smartphone apps. A PIP offloads work from the PEP to keep it lightweight.
- Separation of Concerns—PIPs separate policy information from policy decision-making, making it easier to update and modify policies and AVPs without impacting other parts of the access control system. For example, making fully qualified requests increases the coupling in the system because the PEP has to know more about policies to formulate fully qualified requests.
- Improved Scalability— PIPs can be deployed independently of other access control components, which means that they can be scaled independently as needed to accommodate changes in policy volume or access requests.
- Enhanced Security— PIPs can be configured to provide policy information only to authorized PDPs, which improves the security of the access control system and helps to prevent unauthorized access. In addition, a PIP builds consistent authorization contexts whereas different PEPs might make mistakes or differ in their output.
TradeoffsThere are tradeoffs with using a PIP. For example, suppose that the PEP is embedded in the ERP system and has local access to both the HR and financial data. It might more easily and cheaply use those attributes to create a fully qualified request. Making a minimal request and requiring the PIP to make a call back to the ERP for the data to create the authorization context would be slower. But, as noted above, this solution increases the coupling between the PEP and PDP because the PEP now has to have more knowledge of the policies to make the fully qualified request. Developers need to use their judgement about request formulation to evaluate the tradeoffs.
By creating fully qualified authorization contexts from minimal requests, a PIP reduces the burden on developers building or integrating PEPs, allows for more flexible and reusable policies, and enriches authorization contexts to allow more precise access decisions.
- The information in this article was inspired by Should the Policy Enforcement Point Send All Attributes Needed to Evaluate a Request?